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CLD-230        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-2074 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  GNANA M. CHINNIAH  
and SUGANTHINI CHINNIAH, 
                Petitioners 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the  
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
June 7, 2018 
Before:  CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 27, 2018) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Gnana and Suganthini Chinniah have filed a document with this Court titled 
“petition for extraordinary relief/exercise of supervisory jurisdiction,” which we treat for 
docketing purposes as a petition for a writ of mandamus.  We will deny the petition. 
I. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 The Chinniahs’ petition is partially related to their previous litigation in the United  
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania and in this Court.  In 2008, 
the Chinniahs sued East Pennsboro Township and others raising claims of differential 
treatment on the basis of their ethnicity and religion.  The Chinniahs lost following a jury 
trial at which they were represented by counsel, and we affirmed on their pro se appeal.  
See Chinniah v. E. Pennsboro Twp., 602 F. App’x 558 (3d Cir. 2015).  The Chinniahs 
later filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) seeking relief on the basis of, inter alia, 
allegedly improper contacts between District Court staff and the jury.  The District Court 
denied the motion, and we again affirmed.  See Chinniah v. Twp. of E. Pennsboro, 639 F. 
App’x 89 (3d Cir. 2015).   
Shortly before our ruling, the Chinniahs filed a second lawsuit against the 
Township and others raising claims allegedly arising from their prior suit.  The District 
Court dismissed their complaint, and the Chinniahs’ appeal from that ruling is pending at 
C.A. No. 17-3375.  The Chinniahs also filed two prior mandamus petitions with this 
Court seeking relief (including the District Judge’s disqualification) on the basis of the 
same allegedly improper jury contacts.  We denied those petitions.  See In re Chinniah, 
698 F. App’x 58 (3d Cir. 2017); In re Chinniah, 670 F. App’x 59 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 Presently before the Court is the Chinniahs’ “petition for extraordinary relief/ 
exercise of supervisory jurisdiction.”  The Chinniahs do not seek relief regarding any 
proceeding in the District Court.  Nor do they seek relief regarding their pending appeal.  
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Instead, the Chinniahs have attached yet a third complaint against the Township and 
others seeking to raise claims that appear to be based in part on the same allegedly 
improper jury contacts.  The Chinniahs assert that they would like to file this complaint 
but do not think that any District Judge of the Middle District of Pennsylvania will treat 
them fairly.  Thus, they ask us either to adjudicate the substance of their new complaint 
ourselves or to assign it to a judge outside the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  In the 
alternative, they ask that we refer this matter for alternative dispute resolution. 
II. 
 We will deny their requests.  We are primarily a court of appellate rather than 
original jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2106.  We do have original jurisdiction 
under the All Writs Act to issue extraordinary writs, but we may do so only in aid of 
some independent basis for jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1651; In re Arunachalam, 812 
F.3d 290, 292 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam).  Thus, we have All Writs jurisdiction over 
civil actions that might come within our appellate jurisdiction in the future.  See In re 
Arunachalam, 812 F.3d at 292.  The Chinniahs, however, have neither filed such a civil 
action nor identified any other potential basis for us to exercise our All Writs jurisdiction. 
 Instead, they argue that we can exercise our supervisory authority to grant them 
relief even in the absence of an action pending in a District Court.  In support, they rely 
on Satterfield v. Johnson, 434 F.3d 185, 193 & n.8 (3d Cir. 2006).  In that case, however, 
we addressed the King’s Bench powers of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  See id.  We 
do not have the same powers as a state King’s Bench court.  Cf. Abdul-Akbar v. 
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McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc).  We do have inherent supervisory 
powers, which we have exercised in a variety of contexts and usually to prescribe rules of 
practice or procedure.  See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 809 F.3d 766, 780 (3d Cir. 
2016) (summarizing supervisory authority); United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 204-
05 (3d Cir. 2007) (same).  But we do not appear to have exercised supervisory powers 
over a private dispute in the absence of an independent basis for jurisdiction triggered by 
an appeal or other proceeding relating to an action brought in a District Court. 
 In any event, even if we had the authority to order the relief that the Chinniahs 
request, we would decline to do so.  We will not adjudicate their claims on the merits in 
the first instance.  Nor have the Chinniahs presented any basis for us to assign their 
unfiled complaint to a District Judge outside the Middle District of Pennsylvania or refer 
this non-extant matter for alternative resolution.  The Chinniahs have offered nothing but 
their bald assertion that they cannot receive a fair hearing before any District Judge in the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania.  Indeed, as noted above, we previously denied their 
requests to disqualify the same District Judge who presided over their first two actions.  
We express no opinion on that issue insofar as it may relate to the Chinniahs’ pending 
appeal.  For present purposes, however, the Chinniahs have shown no reason to believe 
that they cannot receive a fair hearing in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 
 The Chinniahs remain free—subject to all applicable rules, including Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 11(b) and (a) and the rules governing venue—to file their third complaint in an 
appropriate District Court.  In so noting, we neither affirmatively suggest that they do so 
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nor express any opinion on the merits of their complaint.  We caution the Chinniahs, 
however, against advancing claims that already have been rejected.  
III. 
 For these reasons, we will deny the petition. 
